

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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14 April 1966

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 April 1966, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. CORREIA do LAGO (Brazil)

FR. MICHAEL

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREIA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LARODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. V. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland: Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania: Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden: Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOLAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. A. A. POSHCHIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. A. A. OZADOVSKY
Mr. A. A. RYABIKOV

United Arab Republic: Mr. H. KHALIF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom: Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TACOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America: Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General: Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the two hundred and fifty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The Swedish delegation very much appreciates the fact that at this meeting and the next one we are to consider collateral measures. Among them is the test-ban issue, on which during this session we have as yet hardly moved forward in our negotiations. It is, however, high time that we took a closer look at the possibilities of reaching an agreement, as we have been directed to do by the General Assembly of the United Nations in terms of urgency (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161). Certain suggestions were made by the Swedish delegation on 10 March (ENDC/PV.247, pp.16 et seq.); and even before I heard the comments made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, pp.19 et seq.) -- those comments are the only ones we have heard so far, and I need not assure my colleagues that we are eagerly looking forward to hearing more -- I had wanted to get an opportunity to supplement my earlier statement with a few remarks in order to facilitate consideration of the whole subject and to avoid possible misunderstandings.

The first clarification which seems to be necessary refers to the nature of the procedure which I called "verification by challenge" and which was really an extension of proposals contained in the Joint Memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28) by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A clear distinction should be made between the terms "verification by challenge" and "inspection by challenge", as the former concept, which I used on 10 March, is considerably wider than the latter. It does not per se raise any demand for inspections, but neither does it exclude them. It is thus not quite correct to assume, as Mr. Fisher did at the outset of his comments, that I have suggested "verification by challenge" in order to present it as an "alternative to on-site inspections" (ENDC/PV.254, p.19).

But it is true, of course, that all our endeavours in regard to a test ban, including the informal collaboration of certain national seismological observation stations, are directed towards reducing the need for controls of a direct, admittedly fairly obtrusive, kind. I shall return to the question of inspections in a little while; but, in order to understand better the general character of the procedure and the implications of our suggestions, some moments must be devoted to an exercise of

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imagination, trying to picture rather concretely the whole range of hypothetical situations which might occur once we had a treaty prohibiting underground test explosions.

In a broad way the entire process which is unfolded if seismic recordings from different parts of the world seem to arouse suspicions that an underground nuclear test explosion might have occurred can be thought of as a continuance of "challenges". In the beginning it may consist of informal exchanges of views based on some telesismic findings which it has not been possible to write off as clearly having been caused by natural earth tremors. Differences in scientific sophistication among different States interested in the upholding of a test-ban treaty may be of importance in this connexion. It is to be expected that in many cases informal questions will be met by spontaneous explanations, perhaps profferring close-in records from seismic stations in the neighbourhood of the event. For developments which have so far been made, no special formulae or prearranged procedures will be needed.

We might have to foresee, however, that sometimes doubts would not be cleared away in this informal manner. Mr. Fisher rightly pointed out that fairly great numbers of "unclear" events might not at our present level of knowledge be excluded from suspicion on purely seismic grounds. I venture to state, however, that in order to classify an event as "suspicious" rather than just "unclear" one would have recourse to several indications in addition to what the seismic signals per se contributed to such a judgement. Such an indication might be whether the location was one where tests would be likely or totally unlikely to occur. I would suggest that even if many unclear events occurred, for instance, in Iceland, nobody would be moved to voice suspicions of clandestine nuclear tests. And there are of course other even less tangible signs to go by.

Such a selection of "suspicious events" with the use of various guides for probability judgements would have to be resorted to, I submit, whether the next step contemplated were a request for inspections or, as I assume to be preferable, at least for this stage, a request, albeit in formal terms, for clarification. Such a request would constitute a formalized "challenge", and I think we would agree that the only body competent to make such a formal "challenge" should be a government party to the treaty -- or several such governments. A quite considerable responsibility must be attached to the "challenger"; the "challenge" should be used

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only for obtaining information about seemingly important events. The challenging government which takes upon itself to voice suspicions should be expected also to furnish documentation for establishment of the event and explanation of its suspicions. The replies, which in turn would be expected to provide new documentary evidence, should in this way be matched by documented queries. A balance of responsibilities must be presupposed -- and that is a feature that was not sufficiently clarified in my earlier presentation.

Finally, the "challenge" may be thought of as entering an ultimate stage: that is, when a party to the treaty is so dissatisfied that it is becoming prepared to give notice of withdrawal from the treaty obligations -- such withdrawal in any case being the only sanction available against a breach of the treaty. As that party must base such a decision on its strong conviction that clandestine testing by another party has created the extraordinary event jeopardizing its national security (ENDC/10C/Rev.1, p.3), it must also be ready to provide the documentation for these suspicions that should accompany its "explanatory memorandum" to the Security Council, in consequence of our proposal that such notification of intention of withdrawal should be made. It is that threat of withdrawal, amply supported by documentation, which should be considered as the decisive challenge that might induce an accused party to invite some inspection. I want to stress the severe character of such a challenge, and I can only express my regret if I was not sufficiently clear on this point in my earlier statement.

Let me hasten to add that the procedure which we have called "verification by challenge" would provide a useful foundation for a test ban treaty whether or not it ended with a deterrent in the form of obligatory on-site inspections -- the ultimate deterrent or sanction in any case being the risk that the treaty was being abrogated. And even if an obligatory inspection has been demanded in a certain case the earlier steps in such a consultation process as I have indicated will have their value for the challenged party. This process may, for instance, have led to enough clarification -- for example, through close-in data -- to reduce the size of the area to be inspected.

I may perhaps therefore be permitted to turn to the representative of the United States, who holds to this requirement of inspections, with the argument that an ordinance about on-site inspections could be introduced at the tail-end of what

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I have called the process of challenge. And, within parentheses, may I ask: What is a demand for inspection if not a challenge? How are the events to be inspected chosen if not by the same process of judging certain events to be more suspicious than others? And what is the sanction, in case an inspection should prove a party's guilt, if not the same withdrawal from the treaty as might follow a defiance of repeated challenges?

In the opposite case, if the agreed will of the parties were to forgo recourse to obligatory inspections, the process of challenging would be a feature that would evolve practically spontaneously. May I reiterate that I am not here taking a position in regard to such inspections, but just want to stress that the construction holds whether obligatory inspections are included or not? Turning in the case of this second possibility rather to the representative of the Soviet Union, may I assure him that any fear would be unfounded that through the concept of "verification by challenge" we might be introducing inspections by, so to speak, the back door if the front door of a treaty were closed to obligatory ones. If obligatory inspections are not to be included, the treaty need not even mention "inspections" at all. It might be sufficient to include in the withdrawal clause some such phrase as the following:

"If satisfactory explanations have not been forthcoming despite demands for them by a government party to the treaty, this government shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatory and acceding States and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests."

That is actually a passage from a well-known treaty, with some slight changes. Under some such formula a government which would be averse to a demand for inspection, even an implicit one in terms of a more or less persistent "challenge", would be free to act according to its best judgement in casu. Another government might use invitation to inspection as one method by which to exculpate itself. Only practical

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experience need decide this point. No government would need to raise in advance obstacles to the very conclusion of such a treaty as long as it was willing to shoulder the constituent obligation: not to conduct underground nuclear test explosions.

Having tried to make clear the neutral character of the concept of "verification by challenge", I must be allowed to voice my own apprehension and that of many others that the great Powers are raising too many difficulties in the way of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive test ban -- an agreement that is so definitely in the interests of all of us. May I quote a very unsophisticated proverb: "Where there's a will, there's a way"? It may not be the way which the Swedish delegation has tried to indicate; but some way might easily be found -- provided, of course, that the obstacles are not political.

The Swedish delegation finds it necessary to raise a second point, which seems not to have been placed sufficiently in focus: that is, that an agreement to ban underground tests is of great concern to many States, not to just a few. The ideas that are held particularly in relation to on-site inspections as the chief instrument for ensuring that such a treaty would be upheld seem still to treat the matter as if it were a question of just two sides, two "adversary" parties to the treaty. This thought-pattern obviously developed during an earlier period when the three-Power Conference -- and the very name is indicative -- was studying the test-ban issue. Now, however, we are in search of an institutional framework that takes into consideration a great number of parties to such a treaty.

The non-proliferation aspect of a comprehensive test ban calls for a reorientation. Our scheme of challenging suspected parties lends itself, I believe, quite well to application not only to the existing nuclear weapon countries but also to what are sometimes called would-be nuclear weapon countries. It also would create a right for them to voice suspicions that some Power might be changing the course of events by again stepping up the armaments race. How would a pattern relying only on obligatory inspections handle these cases? Should all signatories be exposed to the same number of inspections? Who should have the right to ask for them -- should any and all parties to the treaty have such a right? And what about the right to conduct them -- or should that responsibility be delegated only to some? We have to remind ourselves that we have, as I believe, given up the idea of having an

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international commission take on such responsibilities. Is it not then in everybody's interest to have a procedure such as challenging which would be of more general applicability than inspections in loco, to resort to as the more regular feature?

One third and final point. Having considered several varying possibilities of drawing up an agreement for prohibiting underground nuclear tests, I have been struck by the seemingly imperative necessity to have such a ban laid down in a treaty which is formerly separated from the Moscow Agreement on the partial test ban (ENDC/106/Rev.1). This springs to the foreground as soon as we recognize that withdrawal is the only sanction against possible violation. And we must all be desirous that, even if uncertainties should prevail regarding underground tests to such an extent that abrogation threatened, this should not be allowed to place the Moscow Agreement also in jeopardy, thus opening anew the whole gamut of testing possibilities. It has seemed to me necessary to draw attention to this problem at this early stage, as several delegations may be occupied in tentative drafting of the underground test ban.

Such a test ban we must achieve, and we must achieve it in this session. When we recall our United Nations assignment it is evident that we have no right to work solely on one possibility, the prospect of concluding a non-proliferation agreement. Even if that prospect is not as dim as it has hitherto seemed to be, we must also proceed with the comprehensive test ban and, I hope, other collateral measures such as a halt of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. It is to be hoped that we shall from now on sit down in serious negotiations about the details of an underground test-ban treaty and that we shall in our own countries begin to prepare public opinion for a portentous decision in regard to testing.

May I just clothe my concern in the United Nations warning to us in resolution 2032 (XX), "Noting with regret that notwithstanding these resolutions nuclear weapon tests have taken place" (ENDC/161), and also its challenging reminder that the General Assembly is "Mindful of the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ibid.).

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): It is a great pleasure for me to return to Geneva and to rejoin the Committee's active and important work. During

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the few weeks that I have been away because of other duties that recalled me to Washington, I have continued to follow the work of the Conference with close attention. I return to it supported by the renewed determination of my Government to seek early solutions to the many urgent problems before this Committee.

First, I should like to take this opportunity to add my own words of welcome to those already addressed to Mr. Roshchin, the new leader of the Soviet delegation. I have worked with him in the past and I look forward to fruitful collaboration again in our dual capacity as co-Chairmen of this Committee and leaders of our respective delegations. It is also a pleasure for me to greet Mr. Lahoda, who now leads the delegation of Czechoslovakia.

I have listened with great interest to the statement made today by the leader of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Myrdal. I shall study her thoughtful and interesting comments when they appear in the verbatim record. As usual, she has provided us with much food for thought.

Today, in directing the attention of this Conference to collateral measures, we are recognizing the urgency of achieving some real progress in our efforts to halt the nuclear arms race. We are seeking to accomplish such reductions as are possible in today's world, while awaiting agreement on how we can make progress toward general and complete disarmament.

When we come to discuss the provisions of article III of the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/152 and Add.1), we shall be dealing with the safeguards that we seek to have nations accept in connexion with their peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Whenever we discuss safeguards, the question inevitably arises as to a balance between the obligations to be undertaken by the nuclear weapon States and those to be undertaken by the non-nuclear weapon States.

This statement today by the United States delegation deals precisely with the safeguards that would apply to the nuclear weapon States under our proposal (ENDC/120, 165) to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons use, to transfer a total of 100,000 kilograms of U-235 to peaceful uses under safeguards, and to destroy the thousands of nuclear weapons from which the material for such a transfer would be obtained. The stated offer includes a willingness to add plutonium in agreed amounts obtained from the destroyed weapons to the transfer to peaceful uses, if the Soviet Union will do likewise. Thus the total amount of fissionable material transferred to peaceful purposes would be somewhat greater than 100,000 kilograms.

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I stress this measure for two reasons. First it is indeed most germane to the non-proliferation treaty that we are considering. I should point out that the United States position has not changed, that the entry into force of a non-proliferation treaty should not be conditioned upon entry into force of other measures which have been proposed for halting the nuclear arms race. At the same time, the United States recognizes that if we are to halt the nuclear arms race -- not just for a moment but lastingly -- we must have a programme of related measures in addition to a non-proliferation treaty, and we must begin to work on them in the same detail as we have been working on a non-proliferation treaty.

This necessity is recognized both in the fifth paragraph of the preamble and in the second paragraph of article VI of the United States draft treaty. In the preamble the parties to the treaty would express their desire "to achieve effective agreements to halt the ... arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals" (ENDC/152). Article VI provides that after a period of time, which is to be agreed, following entry into force of the treaty, two-thirds of the parties may call a conference of signatories "in order to review the operation of the treaty" (ibid., p.3). I believe one of the topics the parties would be entitled to consider in this review would be how well we were carrying out the intention, expressed in the preamble, of halting the arms race and reducing nuclear arsenals.

The second reason for emphasizing today the cut-off, transfer, and demonstrated destruction proposal (ENDC/165) is that it provides an excellent example of the kind of safeguards which nuclear weapon States should be called upon to accept as part of the task of halting the arms race.

The problem of adequate verification of arms control measures has consistently thwarted our efforts to reach agreement. It is not altogether surprising that this should be so. From time to time within the United States Government, as we have studied possible courses of action in the direction of disarmament, we have had to consider how the intentional or inadvertent disclosure of classified information could be used against us militarily, and we recognize that other States may have similar concerns.

For its part, however, the Soviet Union has branded virtually all of our efforts to design arrangements providing necessary assurances as attempts to gain an opportunity for espionage -- and it has apparently done that without any real analysis of the relative need and simplicity of these verification proposals. We

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continue to hope that the Soviet Union will soon recognize that there is quite another perspective in which inspection for verification can and should be viewed. A State cannot responsibly enter into international commitments which limit its own freedom of action in important security areas unless it feels confident that its own restraint is being matched by that of other parties to the agreement. Let us face this squarely. We are involved in an area where fundamental security interests are at stake --- the area of nuclear weapon defence.

The United States earnestly seeks nuclear arms control measures to increase its own security and the security of other States. But if these measures are to have the desired effect of increasing international stability and decreasing the chances of a nuclear war ever taking place, it is essential that a party should have reasonable confidence that the other parties are carrying out their end of the bargain. In the case of an agreement where purely national means of verification are not deemed adequate, we seek to define and obtain only the minimum amount of inspection needed to let the parties know that the agreement is being fulfilled.

In the case of the cut-off in production of fissionable material and destruction of weapons, the necessary associated verification measures are simple, practical and unobtrusive. There is absolutely no basis for attempting to dismiss them as a scheme for espionage. However, the United States does not propose any particular arms control measure merely because its verification would be simple and practical. We seek measures that have intrinsic value --- that will contribute to peace and security and to our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

Most delegations here have acknowledged the importance of the cut-off and weapons destruction measure; but some delegations have voiced opinions that would seem to deny that what we are proposing is significant. To assert that the cut-off, transfer, and weapons destruction proposal "has nothing in common with disarmament" amounts to stating that slowing down has nothing to do with stopping. Had the cut-off of production of fissionable materials been negotiated when it was first proposed, the United States arsenal of weapons today would have been a fraction of its present size. Without a halt in the near future, nuclear stockpiles are bound to grow ever larger, adding to the vast amounts of potential death and destruction.

Our proposal goes beyond a halt, significant as that is, and seeks an initial reduction in these nuclear stocks. To assert that "only obsolescent weapons

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would be destroyed" is to overlook the fact that a halt in production, and the destruction of thousands of weapons, add up to a net reduction of these weapons. Included in the weapons to be destroyed would be bombs and warheads of a class that have a death-dealing potential which the world fortunately has not experienced. Furthermore, the fissionable material in them, with a half-life of 700 million years in the case of U-235 and 24,000 years in the case of plutonium, will virtually never be obsolete as sources of great amounts of energy -- whether used peacefully or in weapons.

We challenge also the validity of the Soviet assertion that the destroyed weapons would simply be replaced by utilizing the large remaining stocks of fissionable materials. Is the Soviet Union saying it has over-produced fissionable material beyond its weapon requirements to the extent that 40,000 kilograms of U-235 would not be missed? If so, we should be pleased if the Soviet Union would propose an increase in the amount to be transferred by its side. In proposing a transfer of 60,000 versus 40,000 kilograms, the United States has sought to reach numbers large enough to make substantial cuts into the total stocks available for weapons. At the same time, our proposal would not place either side in an intolerable situation of uncertainty in view of the limited amount of information that would be disclosed by the system of verification that we are proposing.

Let me now describe the kinds of safeguards that the United States believes are appropriate to the significance of the cut-off, transfer, and weapons destruction proposal. In doing so, I shall not attempt to describe the complete system of safeguards. I shall rather give a few additional details regarding the kinds of inspection that our studies have shown to be adequate. We would emphasize that these descriptions are intended to stimulate discussion, and not to present a fixed position. We welcome further discussion on the topic of inspection for verification of this measure. We are certain that the capability of generating helpful ideas to provide adequate assurances that agreements are being honoured is not to be found exclusively in any one country.

Our technical specialists have studied, for example, the problem of verifying that plutonium production reactors shut down in compliance with either a production cut-off or reciprocal plant-by-plant reductions remain shut between visits of inspectors. Two alternatives have been investigated. In one case, access would

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be permitted to the working faces of the reactor itself. In the other, access would be permitted only to the exterior of the reactor building or buildings. When access is permitted to the reactor, we believe that visits by inspectors to the reactor could be scheduled at intervals separated by several months, requiring perhaps a week for the initial visit and one or two days for subsequent visits.

The shutdown monitoring system they would utilize includes basically four simple concepts: First, target material is placed in a reactor core to become radioactive in the event of reactor operation. Second, a "safing tape" or wire fixes the location of the target material within the reactor so as to be subject to the reactor's neutron flux, if any. Third, the tape is so fabricated that it is unique, and hence any substitution of the tape can be detected. Fourth, an exterior seal at each end of the channel containing the tape provides the inspection team with assurance that the wire or tapes has remained in its fixed location between inspections.

The target material -- for example, cobalt -- is introduced into the "safing tape" and would be activated approximately linearly with exposure to neutrons. The resulting radioactivity, if any, could be read with standard radiation detection meters.

This system is described in further detail in a working paper which we are submitting today with the request that it be circulated as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/174). Again I would emphasize that it is not our intention to insist on this or any other inspection method or procedure at this time. We offer the paper so that the details of what we have been studying can be considered and commented on by others.

We have also studied possible alternative procedures where access might be limited to the exterior of the reactor buildings. Such a limit could possibly be the external fences surrounding the buildings, if such fences were within 100 or 200 metres of the buildings themselves. Under such circumstances, we believe there is a reasonable chance that a reactor could be monitored satisfactorily by granting near-continuous random access to the perimeter fence. Such access would have to be available on about one hour's notice at any time. The field inspectors would be equipped with neutron and gamma ray detectors as well as equipment sensitive to

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radiation in the infra-red portion of the spectrum. Each of these devices is of standard design and all are familiar to qualified electronic technicians the world over.

The inspection procedures we describe could be utilized by whatever inspection organization was charged with carrying out the inspection. The international Atomic Energy Agency has already developed some procedures for monitoring reactors in operation, and more needs to be done in this area. The Working Paper (ENDC/134) submitted by the United States in June 1964 outlines the procedures we believe to be necessary to monitor other facilities that would be involved in a cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons. We are continuing to study these suggested methods in order to provide greater detail on some future occasion, and we hope that other nations are also giving careful consideration to these problems.

Our proposal to destroy nuclear weapons to obtain fissionable material for transfer to peaceful uses is another example that the procedures we have suggested for consideration are designed to take proper account of the need to protect the sensitive elements of the design of nuclear weapons. These suggested procedures have been outlined before; but let me describe in somewhat more detail the kind of demonstration process we have in mind. Again I would emphasize that the United States does not intend to prejudice future discussion of this subject by advocating any one method of demonstrated destruction. Rather it is our intention to encourage discussion by providing enough detail to focus attention on the kinds of problems that must be worked out if we are to reach agreements in which all parties can participate with confidence.

A facility for demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons would probably consist of a receiving compound, buildings for weapons disassembly enclosed by a security fence, and an assay laboratory for verifying the actual amounts of fissionable materials yielded by the destruction process. In this way, the **total** proposal — including cut-off, destruction, and transfer aspects — is keyed to the fissionable material.

Prior to the introduction of a batch of weapons for processing, inspection personnel would make a walk-through tour of the complete facility to observe that no weapon components or materials were inside. A batch of weapons would then be

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moved into the receiving compound and inspectors would be permitted visual access to the exterior of the weapons, affording an opportunity to count them, and perhaps also to weigh them.

At this point inspectors would retire beyond the security fence but would continue to have access to the perimeter, affording an opportunity to check all movements of material into and out of the external fences.

As a result of the disassembly and destruction process, fissionable material would be brought out through the security fence from time to time to an assay laboratory, where it would be carefully weighed, its isotope composition would be determined, and it would then be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to assure its use for peaceful purposes only. Non-nuclear components would be reduced to a state of rubble that would not disclose classified information and would be shipped out of the facility for final disposal. Such disposal could, for example, consist of deep-ocean burial.

At the conclusion of the processing a batch of weapons, inspectors would again be granted access to the inside of the entire facility to observe that no material has been withheld. This is a simple, straightforward procedure which allows no possibility for espionage, requires no visits to other sites or installations, and in fact protects that information properly classified in the interests of national security.

In conclusion, let me express the hope that by going into some detail about the operations of the type of inspection system which the United States would wish to have considered in connexion with measures to halt the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals, we have made it clear that we are sincere in attempting to provide for only that verification which is necessary to meet the security needs of the participating countries. We apply this principle both to non-nuclear weapon States and to States possessing nuclear weapons.

The obligation of all of us to reach an accord that can reduce the nuclear threat requires compromise by all sides. We hope that our remarks today will be viewed in a spirit of accommodation which will result in the acceptance of reasonable safeguards by the nuclear weapon States. We further believe that the non-nuclear weapon States represented here will agree that such safeguards are in no way less appropriate than those we would seek to have accepted by them.

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We would welcome further comments on this proposed measure from all delegations, and particularly from those non-nuclear weapon States which have stressed the need to make a start in reducing existing nuclear arsenals.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with interest to the statements made in the Committee by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster. We shall study with due attention the considerations, reasons and arguments which they have set forth and shall express in due course our opinion concerning the suggestions put forward in their statements. I should like to thank Mr. Foster for his words of welcome to me.

We should now like to expound the point of view of the Soviet delegation on the questions being considered today by the Committee. The Eighteen-Nation Committee has today resumed the consideration of measures the implementation of which should lead to the lessening of international tension and the elimination of the threat of war. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the reaching of agreement on such measures. In doing so, we take into account the dangerous development of international events, which ever more insistently calls for the elimination of everything that is driving the world towards a nuclear war. In discussing the problems on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, we cannot ignore the fact that the United States of America, having flagrantly violated the Geneva Agreements, is waging a war of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and against the people of South Viet-Nam.

The continuance of this aggression, which the United States of America is trying to extend to other countries of South-East Asia, is fraught with the most dangerous consequences for general peace. The actions of the United States in Viet-Nam are increasing the danger of the outbreak of a world war and directly contradict the statements made by the representatives of the United States, including those made here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, concerning their striving for disarmament and the accomplishment of measures that would pave the way to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

In the situation where nuclear missiles are found in the armaments of States and, as a result of the aggressive policy of the United States, the world may find itself faced with an outbreak of nuclear war, a particularly important and

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urgent task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is to eliminate the danger of war and to accomplish a number of measures connected with nuclear disarmament. Proposals in regard to such measures are contained in the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee of 1 February (ENDC/167). They have also been set forth in the statements of representatives of the socialist and non-aligned countries.

One of the principal measures the implementation of which would considerably reduce the threat of a nuclear war and improve the international situation is the elimination of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories. For this reason we should like to begin our statement of our position on collateral measures by once again drawing the attention of the members of Committee to this urgent question.

As we know, the Western Powers, and first and foremost the United States, have at present on foreign territories, including some immediately adjoining the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, numerous military bases and various kinds of military installations. At these installations they maintain armed forces numbering altogether more than one million men, and are continuing to increase them. The existence of numerous military bases and military installations, and also of large contingents of troops of the United States and the United Kingdom stationed in potentially dangerous areas of the world, is undoubtedly today one of the main sources of international conflict and tension and of the intensification of the threat of a nuclear war.

The military bases of the United States of America and some other Western Powers are being used not only as a means of exerting pressure on peace-loving States. Many of these bases have been turned into springboards for aggression, into instruments for fighting against national liberation movements. It is precisely from United States military bases situated in Asia and in the Far East that American aggression in Viet-Nam has been carried on for a long time already and further persistent efforts are being made to crush the national liberation movement in South Viet-Nam. The elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other countries would make it easier for the peoples of the world to achieve their national aspirations and would set up serious obstacles to the unleashing of wars of aggression against independent States.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The existence of foreign military bases and troops in the territories of other countries also increases the danger of the accidental outbreak of a nuclear war. This was shown, as we have pointed out (ENDC/169 and Corr.1), by the crashing of a United States bomber carrying nuclear weapons over the coast of Spain last January, as a result of which a densely-populated area of Spain was subjected to radioactive contamination; and it was only by chance that the crash did not lead to more harmful and even catastrophic consequences.

In view of the grave dangers involved in the continuation of flights of bombers with nuclear weapons aboard, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to propose once again to the members of the Committee that an appeal be made for the immediate discontinuance of flights of aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard beyond the national borders of States. We may note in this connexion that some West European States, including France, have already taken decisions prohibiting flights over their territories of foreign military aircraft carrying nuclear bombs.

It is precisely for this reason that many States are in favour of the speediest possible solution of the question of eliminating foreign military bases and withdrawing troops from the territories of other countries. Together with the socialist countries the majority of non-aligned States have expressed themselves in favour of this solution to the question. This is shown, in particular, by the statements of many delegations at the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the autumn of 1965. Thus the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Riad, declared in the General Assembly on 7 October last:

"... we consider that the military bases in foreign countries maintained by colonial Powers for the purpose of intimidating and threatening the nationalist movements of liberation constitute a direct menace to international peace and security. Once again we insist on the liquidation of these foreign military bases, and we reject the underlying policies which motivate their presence."

(A/PV.1351, p.33)

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Further evidence to this effect is provided by the resolution adopted at the twentieth session of the General Assembly concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which contains an appeal to all colonial Powers "to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones". (A/RES/2105(XX)) The representatives of a number of countries have also spoken at the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in favour of eliminating foreign military bases and withdrawing troops from the territories of other countries.

The present international situation imperatively requires the urgent elimination of all foreign military bases in the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories. The Soviet delegation deems it essential that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should once again endeavour to reach agreement on the accomplishment of these measures, which would undoubtedly be an important step towards eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and strengthening international security.

Unfortunately we are compelled to note that, as the course of the discussions in the Committee shows, the delegations of the United States and other Western Powers evade discussion of the question of eliminating foreign military bases and withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The efforts of the representatives of these Powers to ignore and sidetrack this urgent international problem of the present day only go to show that their governments are opposed to its solution. Thus progress in this matter turns on the negative position of the West.

Of great importance for improving the international situation, strengthening peace and developing peaceful co-operation among nations would be the creation of denuclearized zones in various areas of the world. The creation of such zones would at the same time make it easier to solve such an important problem as that of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as to accomplish other measures of nuclear disarmament. This has been pointed out on many occasions in the statements of delegates at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, as well as here in the statements of members of our Committee.

The connexion of the question of creating denuclearized zones with the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is also indicated in resolution 2028 (XX), adopted at the aforesaid session of the United Nations General Assembly, which provides for the right of States --

"... to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;" (ENDC/161)

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The question of denuclearized zones is also closely connected with the problem of international security as a whole. The Ethiopian representative, Ambassador Aberra, drew the Committee's attention to this fact when he said:

"The phenomenon of denuclearization is a regional collective endeavour of paramount importance to national security..." (ENDC/PV.242, p.21).

The conclusion of agreements on the creation of denuclearized zones would also help towards the accomplishment of such a disarmament measure as that which we have already mentioned: the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. It is precisely this approach to the problem that is shared by most of the States interested in the effectiveness of denuclearized zones, wherever they may be created: in Africa, Latin America, Europe or other regions of the world.

Of great importance for strengthening peace throughout the world, reducing international tension and halting the arms race would be the implementation of a number of measures with a view to creating a system of security in Europe-- that potentially most dangerous area in the whole world, where, as we have already pointed out, the largest numbers of foreign troops and armaments are concentrated and where huge arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are located.

More than twenty years have passed since the end of the Second World War, but the situation in Europe is still not normal. For more than two decades the United States of America has been maintaining its troops and military bases there, using them as an important lever of influencing the policies and economies of a number of European States. In this connexion we should like to point out that the United States Government is acting contrary to the statement made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference on 5 February 1945 to the effect that United States troops would not remain in Europe for much more than two years after the end of the war. Further, we should like to stress that the United States and the United Kingdom have placed their nuclear weapons at many military bases in Europe and other parts of the world.

The creation in Europe of a system of collective security and the normalization of the situation in that area of the world are of particular importance because one of the States of that continent-- the Federal Republic of Germany -- has taken a course aimed at reviewing the results of the Second World War and restoring the

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frontiers of the defunct Third Reich. Quite recently -- on 25 March -- the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the governments of other States a Note in which to all intents and purposes a claim is made for the revision of the existing frontiers in Europe. In particular it is asserted in the Note that "according to international law, Germany continues to exist within its frontiers of 31 December 1937." It is evident from this Note, which is presented by its authors as practically an "act of goodwill", that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends henceforth to carry on a revanchist policy. The extensive militarization of Western Germany, which at present has the largest number of armed forces in Western Europe, is being carried out precisely for this purpose.

European security must envisage the creation of such conditions as would preclude for ever the possibility of any repetition of German aggression. It should be recalled therefore that the Second World War was followed by the conclusion of the Potsdam Agreement, which was the result of the struggle of the peoples of the world against fascism and the expression of their hopes that Germany would turn its face towards peace and abandon for ever the policy of military adventures. The departure from the Potsdam Agreement -- and some of our former war-time Allies are even trying to claim credit for this -- has resulted in demands for a revision of the map of Europe, the growth of West German armaments, and the claims of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany for the possession of nuclear weapons. All this is producing a highly tense situation in central Europe.

In this connexion we cannot but stress the peaceful policy of the German Democratic Republic aimed at lessening tension in Europe. Evidence of this is also provided by the recent Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/168), in which it solemnly declared that it was ready to enter into a commitment to renounce nuclear weapons provided that the Federal Republic of Germany was prepared to do the same. At the same time it called upon the nuclear Powers, in so far as they have nuclear weapons on German soil, to withdraw these nuclear weapons from German territory and in future keep it free of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Likewise of great importance for ensuring the security of European, and indeed of non-European, countries are the proposals of the People's Republic of Poland for creating a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), and for "freezing nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in that area" (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). Both these proposals have a common objective: to half the nuclear arms race in Central Europe, to lessen tension, to strengthen mutual trust and to create security conditions in that area which would enable other outstanding international problems to be settled. The implementation of the proposal of the People's Republic of Poland to freeze nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in Central Europe would be of great importance for normalizing the situation in the world, since without upsetting the existing balance of forces it would, as was very rightly pointed out by the representative of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn, help to halt the atomic weapons race. (ENDC/PV.247, p.36)

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries fully support these proposals of the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Poland, which are of great importance for the security not only of Europe but also of other continents. We have already stated on many occasions that the transformation of Central Europe into a nuclear-free zone would be a considerable contribution towards the creation of a system based on co-operation and collective security. For the purpose of discussing the proposals of the socialist and other European States concerning a military détente, reduction of armaments in Europe, and the development of peaceful and mutually-advantageous relations among all European countries, and in order to find a basis for agreement on these questions, it would be desirable, as we have already pointed out, to convene an appropriate international conference.

Great attention has been given by all the delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the question of putting an end to nuclear weapon tests underground, the question to which the very detailed statement made today by Mrs. Myrdal was devoted. In many statements it has been stressed that a positive solution of this question would stop the improvement of weapons of mass destruction and greatly help to prevent a further increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union attaches paramount importance to this question. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared its readiness to conclude immediately an international agreement on the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests, although the Soviet Union has carried out far fewer underground tests than the United States

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of America. The Soviet Union considers that an agreement to ban nuclear explosions underground would be carried out effectively, since there exists in many countries seismic equipment of such reliability and sensitivity that no State having agreed to refrain from carrying out underground nuclear tests would venture to carry out nuclear explosions underground in a secret and deceptive manner. The risk of being detected and caught red-handed is too great for anyone to venture to violate such an agreement. This was pointed out as far back as three years ago by some of the most prominent American scientists, including Professor Hans Bethe, Mr. David Inglis and Dr. Bernard Feld, who in a joint declaration published on 9 April 1963 stated:

"Even though a single small test might be concealed by being confused with an earthquake if the test were conducted in a region of frequent earthquake occurrences, any significant series of tests would be almost impossible to conceal." (ENDC/85, p.3)

That was said almost three years ago. The risk has become even greater now that seismic equipment has been considerably improved.

At the meeting of this Committee on 4 April the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, in his statement devoted to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, tried to convince us of the necessity of on-site inspection, without which, allegedly, an agreement on this question cannot be concluded and implemented (ENDC/PV.254, pp.16 et seq.). In insisting on the mandatory carrying out of inspection, the United States is guided by political considerations rather than by the desire to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests underground. The United States cannot fail to know that there is no need for international inspection in order to detect underground nuclear explosions. Nevertheless it brings up this question, thus making it difficult to reach an agreement to ban all nuclear tests.

During the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests which were previously held in Geneva we, to our regret, were repeatedly convinced that the United States shows a tendency to approach the evaluation of scientific data exclusively from the point of view of its political interests, and to repudiate its own previous proposals and the decisions agreed with the other side if those decisions do not fit in with its political aims. That is how the United States acted in 1959 when, after publishing the well-known report of Dr. Berkner, it in fact repudiated the recommendations of the Geneva meeting of experts in July-August 1958, although it had taken part in agreeing them.

(Mr. Noshchin, USSR)

During a number of years at the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests the Soviet Union, being anxious to clear the way towards an agreement, repeatedly met the Western Powers halfway and accepted many of their proposals, including those relating to control. However, after these steps by the Soviet Union the United States, as the negotiations showed, repudiated its own proposals, with the result that the matter once again reached a deadlock. We are thus faced with the question whether the United States is at present interested in the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests and whether is it prepared to come to an understanding in regard to concluding an agreement on this question.

In this connexion we should like to note that the United States Government, as the Soviet delegation pointed out in its statement on 8 March, is planning a new series of underground nuclear weapon tests, calculated for a number of years ahead. (ENDC/PV.246, pp.24, 25). All this compels us to think and assume that the artificially-contrived obstacles in the way of a comprehensive agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests will continue to exist so long as the United States is not prepared to reach agreement on this vital and urgent question.

The question of banning nuclear weapons occupies an important place within the complex of nuclear disarmament measures. As we have already stated here on many occasions, the Soviet Union is in favour of prohibiting such weapons altogether, discontinuing their production, removing them from armaments and liquidating all stocks of them. The prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons is the core of all the Soviet proposals on disarmament questions which the Soviet Government has put forward since the end of the war. The Soviet Union supported the Declaration (A/RES/1653(XVI)) sponsored by Ethiopia and a number of other African States and adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and providing for the convening of a special conference with a view to the signing of an appropriate agreement.

However, the efforts of a number of States to convene such a conference and to ensure the solution of this problem met with the opposition of the United States and some other Western Powers. The United States and other Western Powers adopted a negative attitude towards this idea. At the sixteenth session of the United Nations' General Assembly they voted against the adoption of a declaration on the

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prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The same attitude is also being taken by the NATO Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The question arises, why are the Western Powers preventing the implementation of the proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons? Some light on this position of the Western Powers is shed by the testimony of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, in a Sub-Committee of the United States Congress on defence appropriations, in which he openly declared the intention of the United States to use nuclear weapons in any situation, in any place, whenever it should see fit. That testimony was published on 14 May 1965.

Since the proposals for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their use are rejected by the Western Powers, and in order to break the deadlock in regard to the solution of the question of nuclear disarmament and the consequent elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet Government declared its readiness to assume immediately an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, provided that the other nuclear Powers do likewise (ENDC/167, p.3). Acceptance of this proposal by the nuclear Powers would be a substantial contribution towards normalizing the international situation.

The United States tries to counter the Soviet proposal for the prohibition of nuclear weapons together with the discontinuance of their production and the destruction of all stocks of such weapons by proposing a halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons together with the simultaneous destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of a certain quantity of these materials, removed from atomic bombs (ENDC/120). As we all heard today, the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Foster, was devoted to this subject. It is not difficult to see, however, that, taken by themselves in isolation from the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States proposals for a halt in the production of fissionable materials cannot in any substantial way have an effect on the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, although Mr. Foster tried today to prove the contrary.

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According to the calculations of scientists, there has now already been accumulated in the world such an amount of nuclear explosives as would be quite sufficient to destroy every living thing on this planet many times over. Therefore the mere discontinuance of production of fissionable materials will not be of any use in regard to eliminating this threat. The very raising of the question causes us to think, and even to be firmly convinced, that it is due to over-production of nuclear materials, and that further production is already meeting with practical difficulties arising from the redundancy --- the over-saturation, I would say --- of such materials.

The United States proposal for a demonstrated destruction by the Soviet Union and the United States of a determined quantity of nuclear weapons (ENDC/165) does not introduce anything new, not to mention the fact that such a measure would not reduce the arsenals of the nuclear Powers to any substantial extent. Its implementation would merely amount in practice to getting rid of stocks of obsolescent models of nuclear weapons and replacing them by more perfected types. Indeed, the old models of nuclear weapons are apparently unneeded. They will have to be removed from the arsenals in any case and destroyed in one way or another. For this reason the United States proposal would not lead in practice to nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion we should like to stress that, in order to put an end to the threat of a nuclear war and to the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Government proposes that the nuclear Powers consider the question of the immediate implementation of a programme relating to nuclear disarmament. Such disarmament, as we have pointed out, should provide for the destruction under proper international control of all stocks of nuclear weapons accumulated by the States, the prohibition of their production, the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their production, the elimination of military bases on foreign territories and other measures. Only such measures, and not the removal of merely a few atomic and hydrogen bombs from the huge stocks accumulated by States, can rid the peoples of the world of the threat of a nuclear war.

An agreement on the implementation of measures aimed at removing the threat of a nuclear war and opening the way to the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons would be an important milestone in the struggle to strengthen peace.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to make a brief remark at this point. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, has made an extremely long and detailed statement in which he has dealt solely with political problems. His speech was in clear contrast with the previous statement made by the United States delegation. Whereas Mr. Foster gave us a concrete and precise account of certain predominantly material measures of immediate disarmament, the representative of the Soviet Union brought the Committee back to solely political considerations most of which will obviously call for some kind of rejoinder on our part. As, however, such rejoinder will necessarily be quite a long one, we shall have to study the text of Mr. Roshchin's statement, and I should like to defer such remarks to a later meeting.

Nevertheless, I should like to comment very briefly on the question of the banning of tests. Mr. Roshchin spoke of certain Western proposals which, he claims, the Western Powers have withdrawn and are therefore no longer valid. I do not know exactly which proposals Mr. Roshchin had in mind. He quoted certain American experts, but without specifying which proposals he was thinking of in particular. He criticized such a practice; and indeed, if the situation was as he depicted, it was certainly deserving of criticism.

But here I should like to ask whether the Soviet delegation still considers as valid all the proposals it has put forward so far on the prohibition of tests. It will be remembered that, the Soviet delegation at one time proposed -- or at any rate agreed to -- three annual inspections in connexion with phenomena which might be regarded as caused by nuclear tests. In his statement Mr. Roshchin omitted to mention this Soviet proposal and gave the Committee no inkling whether it is now no longer valid, as appears to be the case (I refer to certain statements made in previous years by the Soviet delegation), or whether, on the contrary, it remains valid and may still be discussed in this Committee. I trust that Mr. Roshchin will be good enough to enlighten us on this matter at one of our forthcoming meetings.

Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): I have asked to speak in order to thank Mr. Foster for welcoming me to this Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 256th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A. Correa do Lago, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, the United States, the Soviet Union and Italy.

"The delegation of the United States submitted a Working Paper on an Inspection Method for Verifying the Status of Shutdown Plutonium Production Reactors".^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/174.

